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SUMMARY OF THE CASE AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant Mary Branch appeals a judgment from the district court
erroneously granting summary judgment to Appellees. Branch, a passenger in a
car driven by her husband, was arrested without arguable probable cause by
Minneapolis police officers under Minnesota’s open container law. After she was
released without any charges filed, she filed this action for the unlawful arrest.
Under the facts and inferences viewed in the light most favorable to Branch,
the officers did not have arguable probable cause to arrest Branch. Officers based
the arrest on a flask found in the car, but there are disputed issues of fact regarding
the location of the flask, whether Branch had constructive possession of the flask,
and whether the flask contained any alcohol at the time of the arrest. Moreover,
the parties agree that there are disputed inferences from the agreed-upon facts. The
Defendants admitted at the hearing on their motion for summary judgment that
they believe there are no factual disputes but, “really more, we believe, disputes of
interpretation of the facts.” A jury should resolve those disputes.
Without arguable probable cause, the officers are not protected by qualified
immunity. And there are disputes of the inferences and facts supporting the
Defendants’ claim to qualified immunity. Thus, the district court erred by granting
summary judgment in the Defendants’ favor. Oral argument will assist the Court
with these issues, and Branch requests twenty minutes to present her case.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction in the trial court was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Appellant
brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. JA8. Summary judgment
was granted to Defendants and judgment was entered in their favor on September
27, 2012. JA181-82. Branch timely filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2012.
JA185. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants
based on finding that they are entitled to qualified immunity was improper.
U.S. Const., amend. IV
U.S. Const., amend. XIV
Minn. Stat. § 169A. 35, subd. 3 (2008)
Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465 (8th Cir. 2010)
Guidry v. Boyd, No. 06-1600, 20087 WL 2317174 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2007)
Minnesota v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1975)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mary Branch filed this action against the Defendants on July 29, 2011. JA7.
The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were
entitled to qualified immunity. JA3. Then Branch filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment of the Defendants’ liability. JA4. After a hearing, the district court

-1-

granted summary judgment in the Defendants’ favor, finding they were entitled to
immunity against Branch’s claims. JA166. The court then entered judgment,
JA184, and Branch timely appeals. JA185.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Mary Branch

Appellant Mary Branch is a fifty-one year old African-American female.
JA129. She holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Addiction Counseling from
Metropolitan State University and a Master of Arts Degree in Marriage and Family
Therapy from St. Mary’s University. JA129. Branch is a licensed drug and
alcohol counselor and, with her educational background in addiction counseling,
works with DWI classes. JA129. She suffers from several medical conditions,
including high blood pressure and high cholesterol. JA131. In order to manage
these conditions, Branch takes both Hydrochlorothiazide and Simvastatin which
cause dehydration, dry mouth, and frequent urination. JA131.
B.

The Traffic Stop

Late in a Sunday evening in September 2007 Branch was on her way home
from a church fellowship event in Stillwater, Minnesota. JA132. Branch was
riding with her husband in his car when he made a short stop at a gas station.
JA132. Officer Garbisch, was patrolling the neighborhood, randomly running
license plates for outstanding warrants, when he discovered that Johnson had an
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outstanding arrest warrant for failing to appear. JA95-97. At approximately 12:30
a.m., Officer Garbisch, along with several other officers, pulled Branch and her
husband over after he had left the gas station and arrested Branch’s husband for
failing to appear at a court hearing. JA86, 131 & 134. As her husband was taken
from the car, arrested and placed into a squad car, Branch remained in the
passenger seat. JA132-33.
Officer Gorman then approached Branch and spoke to her through the rolled
down window. JA133. Gorman said, “Nigger, your black ass is going to jail.”
JA133, 138. A few seconds later, Officer Gorman demanded Branch exit the
vehicle and she complied. JA133. Officer Gorman then told Branch to “[g]et back
in.” JA133. Because Branch believed she had done nothing wrong and thought
the officers would let her drive home, she walked around the vehicle and got in on
the driver’s side. JA133. To Branch’s surprise, Officer Gorman then removed her
from the vehicle and sat her on the curb. JA133. As Branch recounts, Officer
Gorman stood towering over her while she was seated on the ground with her head
lowered in fear and praying for safety. JA133. Branch alleges Officer Gorman
repeatedly called her the “N-word,” belittled her, and pushed her shoulders back
forcing her to look up at him. JA133. Branch remained silent other than her
repeated requests to use the restroom due to her medical condition. JA134-35.
Branch was so nervous that she sat on the curb clenching her phone with both
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hands contemplating whether she should dial 911 because of the officers’ behavior.
JA134. When Officer Gorman saw Branch holding her cell phone he snatched the
phone from her hands and threw it to the ground. JA134. According to Branch,
she overheard the officers discussing whether she would be going to jail and
alleges Officer Gorman stated: “I promised her black ass jail.” JA135. Branch
requested to use the restroom several more times, but her requests were denied.
JA134. Branch was eventually placed in the back of the squad car with her
husband. JA135.
C.

Officer Garbisch Retrieves A Flask From Under The Passenger
Seat

After Branch was removed from the vehicle, Officer Garbisch retrieved a
small metal flask from the car. JA105. Branch saw the officers open the flask,
shake the flask, and proclaim it empty. JA135. Branch did not know the flask was
in the vehicle and had not been drinking any alcohol on that night. JA135. In fact,
neither Officer Garbisch nor Officer Gorman asked Branch whether she had been
drinking or if the flask belonged to her. JA92. More importantly, Branch’s
husband, stated to the officers that the flask belonged to him. JA135. Branch had
not seen the flask for an entire year because it was a birthday gift someone had
given to her husband. JA135. Although Officer Garbisch could not see through
the opening in the flask, he detected an odor of alcohol. JA92-93. However, the
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officers indicated that, at the time of the arrest, the “flask appeared to contain no
liquid.” JA26.
Garbisch described Branch’s behavior on the night of the incident as
belligerent, yet upon a request for explanation of Branch’s behavior, he described
her behavior as that of an average person in a police situation. JA91-92. Garbisch
described Branch as uncooperative because she was “questioning what I was
doing, if I knew what I was doing, why I was doing it, that sort of thing.” JA90.
He described Branch’s verbal expressions as typical of people who are in a police
situation, because they are generally not happy to be there. JA91.
D.

Garbisch Arrests Branch

At Officer Garbisch’s discretion, Branch was arrested for violating
Minnesota’s Open Bottle Law, making it unlawful for a person to possess any open
bottle containing an alcoholic beverage while in a vehicle. JA117. While Branch
was seated in the squad car, her urge to use the restroom did not subside. Branch
has several medical conditions, two of which are high blood pressure and high
cholesterol. JA131. In order to control these conditions, Branch takes medication
(Hydrochlorothiazide and Simvastatin) that leaves her mouth dry and causes her to
feel dehydrated. JA131.
In order to satisfy her dehydration, Branch carries several water bottles with
her, thus increasing her frequency of urination. JA131. Branch usually keeps four
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or five bottles with her most of the time. JA131. On the night Branch was
arrested, she was drinking a water bottle on the way home. JA131. The officers
continued to refuse Branch’s pleas to use the restroom, and Branch unable to
control it any longer, urinated on herself in the back of the squad car as they rode
away from the scene. JA135. Eventually, Branch was released and the charge was
dropped. JA39.
E.

Branch Sues, And The District Court Grants Summary Judgment
to the Officers

Branch immediately filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Minneapolis
Department of Civil Rights. JA169. She ultimately sued the city and the officers,
asserting claims for: (1) deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to
unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) false arrest and
false imprisonment; (3) civil conspiracy depriving her of her civil rights; and (4)
violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) because she experienced
discrimination based on her race. JA170. Early in the litigation, Branch moved for
summary judgment of liability against Gorman and Garbisch, and the motion was
denied. JA2.
Defendants later moved for summary judgment on all of Branch’s claims
based on qualified immunity, and an argument that the officers had arguable
probable cause to arrest Branch. JA4-5. Branch cross-moved for summary
judgment as to liability and opposed the Defendants’ motion for summary
-6-

judgment. JA4-5. Branch conceded dismissal of her race-based MHRA claim to
the extent it is asserted against Garbisch, and did not proceed with claims against
the city with discovery completed. JA170-71. In opposition to the remainder of
the motion for summary judgment, Branch denied possession of the flask and
stated she was not drinking on the night she was arrested. JA173-74. Further, she
argued that there were disputes of fact regarding whether she possessed the flask
and whether the flask was empty. Id.
At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, Defendants claimed
that there were no disputes of fact, but admitted that there were “disputes of
interpretation of the facts.” JA152. Still the court granted summary judgment,
dismissing Branch’s federal claim and some state claims with prejudice, and
dismissing the remaining state claims without prejudice. JA181-82. The court
resolved that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Branch because of
Branch’s proximity to the flask, her requests to use the bathroom, her presence in a
vehicle at night, and her alleged belligerence. JA176-79. It did so despite
conflicting evidence on the location of the flask and her proximity to the flask and
also despite conflicting potential inferences to arise from the facts that Branch was
in a car at night and had to use the bathroom. JA167-70. Indeed, the court stopped
short of stating that the need to use the bathroom suggested Branch was drinking
alcohol—it concluded that the fact that she urinated indicated she was “drinking
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something before the car was stopped”—but the Court still considered this enough
to warrant Branch’s arrest. JA177.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants openly admit there are “disputes of interpretation of the facts.”
JA152. In light of such disputes—as well as disputes of the facts themselves—the
district court’s grant of summary judgment was improper. Summary judgment is
not appropriate when either material facts are in dispute or when a reasonable jury
could draw differing interpretations or inferences from those material facts.
Defendants’ statement that they “believe” disputes exist as to “interpretation of the
facts” prohibit summary judgment in their favor.
The Defendants’ claims to qualified immunity cannot be effective, because
their arrest of Branch violated her Fourth Amendment Rights, which were clearly
established at the time of the violation. For qualified immunity to bar a Section
1983 claim based on the Fourth Amendment right against unlawful arrests, there
must be arguable probable cause to arrest. And Minnesota law is clear that to
establish probable cause to arrest under the open container law, mere proximity to
an open container is not enough. Defendants certainly have not met this
“proximity plus” standard to a degree that there is no reasonable inference that the
officers lacked arguable probable cause to arrest Branch.
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The district court did not demonstrate a compelling factor beyond mere
proximity. The factors it addressed, such as Branch’s request to use the restroom
and the time of day, are inadequate to rule that no reasonable jury could find that
the officers lacked arguable probable cause. Given the number of water bottles on
the floor of the car, it was a far more reasonable presumption that Branch drank
some or all of those. Indeed, the district court recognized that all it could find
based on Branch’s need to use the restroom is that she drank something sometime
to being pulled over. That is no evidence at all to support an arrest. Nor does the
time provide support, given that any person may be on the road for any reason at
any time, and this was a Sunday night turning into Monday morning. If facts like
these can support a finding that no jury could find a lack of arguable probable
cause, the standard is meaningless in light of the fact that any arrest will involve
some benign facts like this.
Further, there are issues of material fact that remain unresolved regarding
Branch’s arrest, including the location of the flask in question and whether the
officers believed it contained any alcohol. Properly construing these facts in the
light most favorable to Branch, there is not enough evidence to support the District
Court’s finding of summary judgment for the Defendants.

-9-

For these reasons, as more fully explained below, the grant of summary
judgment to Defendants is improper, should be overturned, and this case should be
remanded to the District Court for a trial on the merits.
ARGUMENT
I.

MINNESOTA HAS ESTABLISHED A PROXIMITY PLUS TEST
FOR DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST FOR
VIOLATING THE OPEN CONTAINER LAW.
A.

When Violating and Individual’s Fourth Amendment Rights with
a Warrantless Arrest an Officer is Only Entitled to Qualified
Immunity if There Was Arguable Probable Cause to Arrest.

When analyzing a qualified immunity claim in a Section 1983 case, courts
have looked to whether the facts show that the conduct at issue violated a
constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation. Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 798 (8th Cir. 2004),
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). The Fourth Amendment’s bar against
unreasonable searches and seizures was a clearly established right at the time of
Branch’s arrest; therefore, appellants need only demonstrate that the facts establish
a violation of that right. Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th
Cir. 2010); see also Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 236-37 (8th Cir. 2011)
(finding that an officer going outside his clearly established duties is not entitled to
qualified immunity).
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In Section 1983 cases involving violation of a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
rights, police officers may be able to avail himself of qualified immunity. Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Under such circumstances, officers are immune to
suit if “they arrest a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable
cause to do so, provided that the mistake is objectively reasonable.” Amrine v.
Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th Cir. 2008). Stated another way, the legal standard
through which to evaluate the factual claims is, arguable probable cause; however,
even with this lower standard, when there is a genuine issue of probable cause a
grant of qualified immunity is improper. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
657 n.12 (1987), Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 1987), Jasinski
v. Adams, 781 F.2d 843, 845-46 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), Deary v. Three
Unnamed Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1984). The facts in this
case demonstrate that, at the least, a genuine issue fact exists as to whether the
officers had probable cause to arrest Branch. The factual circumstances of this
case are so unclear, based on disputes in testimony and evidence presented, that
this case improperly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
lower court failed to construe pertinent facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party; had it done so, the court could not have granted the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.
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B.

To Establish Constructive Possession, Minnesota Law Requires
Proximity and Additional Plus Factors That Confirm the
Individual’s Conscious Control.

Courts look to the relevant law under which a person was arrested to
determine whether arguable probable cause existed. Galarnyk v. Fraser, 687 F.3d
1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 2012) (looking to Missouri state law to determine if officers
had qualified immunity); Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952, 960 (8th Cir. 2011)
([T]he relevant inquiry [for qualified immunity] is whether the sergeant had
probable cause, or at least arguable probable cause, to believe that [the defendant]
was violating Minnesota gambling law . . . .”). Minnesota law requires that
constructive possession be shown by establishing either that the item in question
was in a place under the defendant’s control, in a fashion in which others do not
normally have access, or that “there is a strong probability” that the defendant was
“consciously exercising dominion and control” over the item. Minnesota v.
Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975). This standard requires more than
mere proximity to contraband; it requires some affirmative additional plus-factor
that confirms a finding of conscious control. Compare Minnesota v. Cusick, 387
N.W.2d 179, 181 (Minn. 1986) (finding constructive possession of cocaine when,
in addition to physical proximity of the contraband, defendant’s wallet was found
near the cocaine and none of the possessions of the person claiming ownership
were found in the immediate area), with Minnesota v. Rhodes, No. A11-770, 2012
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WL 1380325, 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 328 (Minn. App. Apr. 23, 2012)
(finding that mere proximity of the defendant to drug paraphernalia was not
enough to show constructive possession, when the paraphernalia was found in a
house where several drug users resided). Without the additional factor confirming
possession, mere proximity “fail[s] to exclude the reasonable, rational inference
that someone other than respondent possessed” the item. Minnesota v. Rhodes, at
*4, 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS at *10.
II.

A REASONABLE TRIER OF FACT COULD FIND THAT THERE
WAS NO ARGUABLE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST BRANCH
UNDER THE PROXIMITY PLUS TEST.
A district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.

Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992). Summary
judgment is properly granted only if there exists no genuine issue of material fact
when viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. McCuen
v. Polk County, Iowa, 893 F.2d 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1990). When there is a material
issue of fact, summary judgment must be denied, because “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Likewise, “when conflicting
inferences can be drawn from the facts, summary judgment is inappropriate.”
Snyder v. U.S., 717 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1983). Denial of summary judgment
only requires that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute”
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would require a finder of fact to assess the “differing versions of the truth at trial.”
Id. at 249.
A.

A Reasonable Jury Could Infer From The Facts, Taken In The
Light Most Favorable To Branch, That She Was Not In Proximity
To The Flask.

In order to be found in violation of Minnesota’s open container law, one
must “have in [their] possession, while in a private motor vehicle . . ., any bottle or
receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage.” Minn. Stat. § 169A. 35, subd. 3
(2008) (emphasis added). There are a number of material facts that, based on the
discrepancy in testimony and other evidence presented, are disputed or have
disputed interpretations. Defendants admitted at the hearing on summary judgment
when they stated that there are “disputes of interpretation of the facts.” JA152.
These disputed facts and inferences alone should be enough to deny the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and when these facts are construed in
the light most favorable to Branch, it is clear that summary judgment is
inappropriate in this case.
First, there is a dispute as to the material fact of the flask’s location in the
vehicle and thus a dispute as to whether Branch was in proximity to that flask. The
district court acknowledged this discrepancy stating that “[t]he record is unclear (1)
which officer first spotted the flask and (2) precisely where it was located.”
JA168. The flask could have been located in three different places: “either

- 14 -

completely under the passenger seat where Branch had been sitting, partially under
that seat with its end exposed, or on the floor in front of the passenger seat, near
where Branch’s feet had been located.” JA168. In addition, “Branch denied
knowing the flask was in the car or drinking on the night in question.” JA168.
When construed in the light most favorable to Branch, the court must accept the
possibility that the flask was fully under the passenger seat, completely hidden
from Branch’s view and not in her “possession.” As a result of the disputed nature
of this material fact, summary judgment in Defendant’s favor is inappropriate.
Second, there is a dispute as to the material fact of whether the flask
contained any alcohol at the time of the arrest. A plain reading of the law indicates
that the receptacle must contain an alcoholic beverage or spirit at the time of the
arrest. However, the record clearly reflects conflicting testimony about whether
the flask contained any alcohol whatsoever. JA169. As the District Court noted,
“According to Branch, the officers opened the flask, shook it, and proclaimed it
empty. Garbisch testified that he opened the flask’s cap but could not see through
its narrow opening. He detected a strong odor of alcohol, however, suggesting to
him that at least some amount of alcohol was in the flask.” JA169. A critical and
material element, necessary to establish probable cause of a violation of
Minnesota’s open container law, is whether the officers really believed the flask
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contained alcohol. Because this necessary, material fact is disputed, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
The district court postulates that one might be found in violation of an open
container law even when the container is empty, “as long as an officer has an
objectively reasonable basis to conclude that [the container] contained alcohol at
some point while in a moving vehicle.” JA178. The court cites several cases
stating that it is irrelevant whether there was alcohol in the container at the time of
arrest. JA178-80. That is true only insofar as it strays from whether the arresting
officers believed there was alcohol in the container at the time of arrest. But their
subjective beliefs on the contents of the flask are relevant to the totality of the
circumstances supporting the arrest. And here, there is a dispute as to whether the
officers believed there was alcohol in the flack—the officers proclaimed the flask
empty. JA169.
The open container law requires that one must possess a “receptacle
containing an alcoholic beverage.” Minn. Stat. § 169A. 35, subd. 3. (2008)
(emphasis added). Thus, the district court’s theory relies on an officer finding
abundant circumstantial evidence to support that basis for arrest and render it
“objectively reasonable.” Such evidence does not exist here.
The court gave a hypothetical that proves this point. In the hypothetical, a
driver was found in violation of the open container law when after being pulled
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over for “weaving erratically” on the road and “manifest[ing] other symptoms of
intoxication,” officers found six empty beer cans at his feet, in the driver’s seat of
the car that were cold to the touch. Id. In stark contrast to the present case, the
District Court’s hypothetical contains a number of factors indicating intoxication,
and the operation of a vehicle while intoxicated, which simply are not existent
here. Branch was not the driver of the vehicle, she was not manifesting other
symptoms of intoxication and only one small empty receptacle was found out of
view, somewhere under the passenger’s seat. Moreover, there was no evidence,
like the flask being “cold to the touch,” suggesting that it recently held alcohol.
A closer analog would involve a passenger in a vehicle carrying a recycling
bin containing empty beer bottles on their way to a recycling center. So long as
there are minor other factors, such as a passenger needing to go to the bathroom, or
the passenger being angry at being questioned by police, an officer is entitled to
summary judgment based on qualified immunity under the district court’s
reasoning. The absurdity of such a conclusion shows how the district court’s
interpretation cannot be correct. Construing the disputed facts in the light most
favorable to Branch, the officers must be assumed to have believed that the flask
contained no alcohol at the time of the arrest. More importantly, when viewed in
the light most favorable to Branch, it must be concluded that the officers opened
the flask, determined it was empty, had a belief that it was empty, yet still
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proceeded to arrest Branch. A reasonable jury could find that there was never in
possession of receptacle containing alcohol because the receptacle had clearly been
empty for a long time and that the officers lacked arguable probable cause.
Therefore, summary judgment in the Defendants’ favor is inappropriate because
there is a dispute of material fact regarding whether the officers could reasonably
believe that Branch was even in proximity to an open container with alcohol in it
while the car was moving.
B.

A Reasonable Jury Could Infer That There Were No “Plus
Factors” Supporting a Determination of Constructive Possession
Sufficient to Provide the Arguable Probable Cause to Arrest
Branch.

Even if Branch had been in proximity to the flask, and it contained alcohol, a
reasonable jury could infer that there were no plus factors on which a reasonable
officer would find probable cause to arrest Branch. The flask was not on Branch’s
person, but rather was somewhere in the vicinity of the passenger seat. JA168-69.
Upon the flask’s discovery, Branch’s husband admitted the flask belonged to him
and was part of a gift set that he had received for his birthday. JA135. There is no
evidence that Branch even knew of the flask’s existence in the car. The officers
never asked Branch if she had been drinking or if she knew of the flask’s presence,
and she never took any affirmative action during the stop to show that she knew
the flask was there. JA168 n 3. There is no evidence that Branch knew of the
flask’s presence, and therefore no evidence that she exercised control over it.
- 18 -

1.

The District Court Applied only Disputed or Irrelevant
Facts as Potential “Plus Factors” for Constructive
Possession.

The “plus factors” cited by the district court do not outweigh the myriad
factors indicating that arrest was improper. Indeed, a reasonable jury could infer
that they are not plus factors at all. The court relied on three facts to determine that
there were sufficient “plus factors” to support probable cause to arrest Branch as a
matter of law: (1) “she repeatedly asked the officers to use the bathroom,” (2) it
was dark, and so she could not be seen drinking, and (3) Branch was acting
belligerently toward officers. JA177. These facts do not rise to the level of
legitimate plus factors showing constructive possession.
Branch admits that she repeatedly asked to use the bathroom, which the
district court characterizes as proof that she was drinking “something.” JA177.
That reasoning has two flaws. First, it assumes that she was drinking something in
the car. But it is common experience among all humans that the urge to urinate
often—if not usually—occurs with some delay after drinking something. The need
to urinate does not tell the officer anything about whether Branch drank something
while in the car, and it certainly does not give the officer license to assume she
drank something alcoholic, given the empty water bottles also present. Moreover,
the fact that she asked repeatedly is irrelevant since she was never provided the
opportunity to relieve herself.
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Similarly, the fact that it was dark tells the officer nothing. A reasonable
jury could find the darkness irrelevant, given the fact that it is dark much of any
given day, and allowing such a fact to support probable cause would give police
license to arrest anyone for anything so long as it is dark outside.
And Branch’s purported “belligerence” was a disputed fact within the
officers’ own testimony. Garbisch himself testified that Branch’s “belligerence”
was a typical reaction of someone placed in a similar situation. Indeed, some
belligerence is unsurprising, in light of the fact that Branch badly needed to
urinate—so badly that she ultimately did so in the back seat of the squad car—and
the officers gave her no opportunity to do so. Given the typicality of Branch’s
behavior, it also cannot support the district court’s finding that the officers had
arguable probable cause to arrest Branch as a matter of law.
An officer has a duty to look at the cumulative effect of all facts and
circumstances at the time of arrest to determine whether probable cause exists.
United States v. Capers, 685 F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1982). Under the district
court’s reasoning, Branch was arrested because she had to urinate at night and
happened to have been near a flask that once contained alcohol, but officers
believed it to be empty. When those facts are considered in light of the myriad
facts establishing that Branch was never in possession of the flask—such as her
husband’s admission that the flask was his and the empty water bottles in the car—
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it is plain that a reasonable jury could infer that a reasonable officer would accept
that Branch might have had to urinate because she drank water in the car or might
have had to urinate because of whatever she drank before she got into the car, and
that a reasonable officer would recognize that there was no probable cause to arrest
Branch.
2.

The District Court Ultimately Relied on the Incorrect Mere
Proximity Standard.

While discussing the proximity plus test, the district court implied that,
because of the standard for qualified immunity is arguable probable cause, the
court “cannot say that a police officer acts unreasonably in concluding that a
passenger constructively possesses contraband found in her immediate vicinity in a
vehicle.” JA176. The district court essentially conflates the standard of arguable
probable cause with the rule requiring a proximity plus test. However, because
mere proximity can never create constructive possession, mere proximity alone can
never give rise to arguable probable cause. “‘The substance of all the definitions
of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’” Baribeau v. City of
Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). And when
conduct has been deemed insufficient to support liability under a criminal statute
by the Minnesota Supreme Court, officers cannot rely upon it to find probable
cause to arrest. Id. at 478 (holding officers lacked arguable probable cause to
arrest for disorderly conduct when arrestees were engaged in expressive conduct).
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Nor can obviously flawed evidence—such as the need to urinate or the fact that it
is dark out—support arguable probable cause. Livers v. Schenck, __ F.3d __, No.
11-1877, 2012 WL 5439300 *15 (8th Cir. Nov. 8, 2012) (coerced confession could
not support arguable probable cause to arrest another person implicated in
confession).
The cases the court cited for a mere proximity rule do not support the court’s
conclusion. Rather, they all involve facts supporting the proximity plus standard
and highlight the differences from this case. The case the district court relied on
most, Guidry v. Boyd, No. 06-1600, 20087 WL 2317174 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2007)
bears no resemblance to this one. There, the police arrested the driver of a vehicle
after seeing two open beer bottles on the passenger side floor of the car. Id. at *2.
The officers did not know whether the bottles were empty, but it is undisputed that
during the Terry stop, but before the arrest, the officers discovered in the back seat
of the car an opened 12-pack of beers from which the possibly-empty bottles
clearly came. Id. Given those facts—empty beer bottles that came from a 12-pack
within reach that had full beer bottles in it—there could not be any dispute that the
police had arguable probable cause to arrest the driver.
The district court’s remaining cases fare no better. In Jack v. Hansell, No.
6:08–cv–2069, 2010 WL 3517040 at *7, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92651 at *20-21
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2010), the individual in question not only had mere proximity
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to the contraband, he was also the only passenger with control over backseat, the
area of the car where contraband was found. The extra plus factor of having sole
control over the backseat brought the case from mere proximity to constructive
possession. King v. Newell, No. 7:06–CV–57, 2007 WL 2705553 at *3, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 70158 at *8 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2007), also contains an additional
plus factor the district court did not address; in this case, additional criminal
conduct. The defendants admitted to being in possession of a stolen vehicle, and
there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Id. These additional factors of
criminal conduct support a proximity plus test, and not that mere proximity, alone,
can create constructive possession and establish arguable probable cause.
The cases cited by the District Court to indicate Minnesota’s use of a mere
proximity standard also support Branch, for they all indicate a use of the proximity
plus test. In Minnesota v. Olson, 326 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Minn. 1982), the
defendant verbally confirmed ownership of the contraband; in Minnesota v.
Rockett, No. A07–2318, 2009 WL 910698 at *1, 2009 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS
352 at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009), the law enforcement officer saw the
defendant shove an unidentified object between the seats of the car; and in
Minnesota v. Wilson, No. C9-99-1306, 2000 WL 719493 at *1, 2000 Minn. App.
LEXIS 538 at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 2000), the defendant was sitting on top
of the object in question. None of these plus factors are present here; Branch did
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not claim ownership of the flask (in fact, her husband did), she made no motions to
indicate she was hiding the flask during the initial moments of the traffic stop, and
the flask was beneath her seat in the car, not directly beneath her person.
Moreover, while each of these cases can be distinguished on their facts, each also
stands for the opposite principle from what the District Court indicated, that
constructive possession requires more than mere proximity to be valid.
The cases cited by the District Court reinforce the conclusion that
constructive possession requires a proximity plus standard. And simply put, the
facts in all of those cases go beyond the facts here to establish arguable probable
cause, especially when the facts are taken in the light most favorable to Branch.
There are disputes of fact over whether Branch was in proximity to an open
container with alcohol in it. And there are disputed facts and inferences regarding
whether a reasonable officer would find the appropriate plus factor to support
arrest based solely on the need to urinate, the darkness, and belligerence that the
officer himself deemed typical. Thus, the district court’s finding that the
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity should be overturned.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the grant of summary judgment to the Defendants
in this case should be reversed and the case should be remanded for further
proceedings.
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